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Abstract: This study examined age differences in young people’s understanding of evolution theory in
secondary school. A second aimof this studywas to propose a newcoding scheme thatmore accurately described
students’ conceptual understanding about evolutionary theory.We argue that coding schemes adopted in previous
researchmayhaveoverestimated students’ graspof evolutionaryconcepts.A total of 106students aged12, 14, and
16 took part in individual interviews investigating their understandingof evolution.Using the newcoding scheme,
we found thatwhile16-yearoldsweremore likely than12-yearolds toendorse scientificconceptswhenanswering
a question about finches, their understanding of natural selection, however, did not generalize to the other
four questions. Furthermore, students began to incorporate relevant terminology (e.g., adapt, evolve, etc.) and
structure their explanations using relevant language at around age 14. Students often used relevant terminology
without having a more advanced understanding of evolutionary theory. Instead, they used the relevant terms in a
colloquial rather than a scientific sense. Implications of the current findings for teaching and theory are discussed.
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Students’ use of multiple epistemologies in scientific reasoning has been well established
(Bang&Medin, 2010; Chinn& Samarapungavan, 2001; Duit & Treagust, 2003; Evans, Legare,
& Rosengren, 2011; Gelman & Rhodes, 2012; King & Kitchener, 2004; Kuhn, 1993;
Rosengren & Evans, 2012; Shtulman & Calabi, 2013). When explaining scientific phenomena,
students often simultaneously evoke both intuitive and scientific ideas (Evans et al., 2011;
Evans & Lane, 2011; Hammer & Elby, 2003; Harris & Koenig, 2006; Harrison & Treagust,
2001; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Legare, Evans, Rosengren, & Harris, 2012). For example, in
physics, 8-year-old children dropped a ball early to reach a target (implicitly endorsing a
parabolic function) even when endorsing an incorrect straight-down trajectory (Krist, 2000,
study 2), which shows that they may endorse different epistemologies for the same object.
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Similarly in biology,when asked to explain processes of species change, students often assume a
need-based view where evolution is assumed to occur at the individual level rather than the
population level (Kelemen, 2004, 2012; Poling&Evans, 2002; Southerland,Abrams,Cummins,
& Anelmo, 2001), invoking both intuitive (need-based reasoning) and scientific reasoning
(randommutation).However, because past research on students’ understanding about biological
evolution has not allowed for students’ use of multiple epistemologies, it thus may have
overestimated the coherence of their understanding of this theory. For example, in a study
examining Spanish secondary school students’ understanding of biological evolution, Banet
and Ayuso (2003) categorized students’ mental frameworks as either Lamarckian or Darwinian.
Similarly in an intervention study where Dutch students were given guided instructions over
2 weeks (two lessons, 50minutes each) to reinvent evolutionary theory, Geraedts and Boersma
(2006) described students’ pre-instruction understanding as Lamarckian and post-instruction
understanding as Darwinian. Other studies have likewise categorized students’ understanding
of evolution as either consisting of na€ıve conceptions or scientific ones (Bishop & Anderson,
1990; Demastes, Settlage, & Good, 1995; Jensen & Finley, 1995, 1996). However, people’s
reasoning about biological evolution is rarely based either on intuitive or scientific knowledge
alone (Evans et al., 2010; Spiegel et al., 2012). In a seminal study investigatingAmerican adults’
reasoning about evolution prior to visiting a natural history museum, Evans et al. (2010) found
that 72% of adult museum visitors tended to invoke scientific and intuitive explanations
simultaneously for species change. A further 28% of participants endorsed a reasoning
framework that also included creationist explanations in addition to scientific and intuitive
explanations. In this study, we investigate English secondary students’ reasoning about
biological evolution, with a focus onmultiple epistemologies.
Theoretical Framework
Many people represent multiple and seemingly contradictory epistemologies in their
understanding of evolution (Chinn & Brewer, 1993; Evans et al., 2011; Gelman & Legare, 2011).
Evans et al. (2010) propose different models for how people may allow these seemingly
contradictory beliefs to co-exist. For example, people may explain species change using
different epistemologies, they may invoke them in different contexts, or the epistemologies
may be fused in a non-systematicmanner.
Na€ıve Theories. One epistemology frequently cited in students’ reasoning about biological
evolution is the use of na€ıve or folk biological and psychological theories (Evans, 2000; Evans,
Rosengren, Lane, & Price, 2012; Gelman&Kremer, 1991; Kelemen, 1999, 2004, 2012; Kelemen
& DiYanni, 2005; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Poling & Evans, 2002; Rosengren & Evans, 2012).
Na€ıve theories are general rules that children learn about the physical world through personal and
direct experiences with the world. These biases tend to be fairly well ingrained in children’s
problem solving repertoires such that children frequently draw on these na€ıve explanatory
frameworks regardless of the framework’s appropriateness (Chinn & Brewer, 1993; Gelman &
Legare, 2011). These na€ıve theories give rise to different types of reasoning, such as essentialism,
which comes from a na€ıve biology perspective. Essentialism is the assumption that there are
biologically determined essences that differentiate one species fromanother; this innate essence is
assumed to be passed on through biological reproduction (Coley & Tanner, 2012; Gelman, 2004;
Gelman&Rhodes, 2012). The concept of essentialism accepts that living organismsmay change,
but such changes are deemed superficial, and that the core essences of organisms remain
unchanged as before (i.e., caterpillar! butterfly; Gelman & Rhodes, 2012). While essentialist
beliefs are not entirely at odds with evolutionary theory, because lateral species change truly
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cannot occur (i.e., a change from a cat to a dog), strong commitments to species stability without
consideration for individual variability may hinder people’s understandings of the theory (Coley
&Muratore, 2012;Gelman&Rhodes, 2012; Shtulman&Calabi, 2013).
Also contributing to students’ epistemological beliefs about biological evolution is the idea
of teleology, which comes from intuitive psychology. This is the assumption that every part or
property of a living thing has a specific purpose (Poling & Evans, 2002). Children between the
ages of 6 and 7 years generously apply this type of reasoning to both animate and naturally
occurring inanimate objects (Kelemen, 1999). Not until 10 years of age do children restrict their
teleological thinking to animate objects (Poling&Evans, 2002). Kelemen (1999) argues that over
attribution of teleological thinking is an extension of younger children’s intentional thinking.
Attributing mental states to all objects (intentional reasoning), both animate and inanimate, is
typical of (but not exclusive to) 6- to 7-year-old children (Poling & Evans, 2002). More recently,
Kelemen and Rosset (2009) found that teleological thinking continues to remain in adults’
conceptual search space as default mechanisms, even among professional scientists (Kelemen,
Rottman,&Seston, 2013).
National Science Curriculum in England. In addition to intuitive theories, people may also
invoke theories dominant in their socio-cultural milieu, such as scientific theories or religious
ideas. One of these cultural beliefs includes evolutionary theory (Evans et al., 2010). To
understand the role of formal education in the development of English students’ understanding of
evolutionary theory, theNational Curriculum inEnglandmust be understood.
In the National Curriculum1 for Science in England, students are introduced to the topic of
evolution between the ages of 11 and 16 years (Key Stages 3 and 4; Department for Education,
2013a, b). Between the ages of 11 and 14 years, students learn about inheritance, chromosomes,
DNA, and genes. The specific content covered includes learning about heredity as a genetic
process; that differences between and within species can be attributed to differences in genetic
information; that variation between individuals within a species is either continuous or
discontinuous; the role of variation in natural selection; organism-environment fit and extinction;
and the need for biodiversity (Department for Education, 2013a). For example, a unit on evolution
for students between the ages of 11 and 14 years introduces students to evolutionary theory by
exploring the ideas proposed by Darwin and Lamarck about evolution. Students further explore
the concept of natural selection before moving on to the concept of extinction (the dodo bird and
dinosaurs are often used as examples of extinct species). Students learn that extinction is caused
by changes in the environment (e.g., a new disease, a new predator, a change in the physical
environment, climate change, etc.), leading to a particular species being less able to compete and
reproduce successfully. Students also learn that endangered species (e.g., pandas, gorillas, etc.)
are on the brink of extinction. Species may become extinct because of the critically low level of
available habitats for these animals or because the population of a species has fallen below a
critical level. Finally, the unit of evolution ends with having students learn about biodiversity, and
the conservation efforts to protect endangered species.
In grades with students aged 14–16 years, the curriculum continues to build on the earlier
content to teach students that genetic mutation causing variation occurs at the gene level; that
sexual reproduction contributes to variation within a population; monohybrid inheritance occurs
when there are dominant and recessive alleles; the evolution of new species ensues over time
through natural selection; genetic variation and environmental factors contribute to evolution
(e.g., bacterial resistance to antibiotics, human evolution). They also learn about adaptation,
evidence for evolution from geology and other fields, common descent, the three-domain model
based onDNAanalysis, Darwin andMendel, and vocabulary specific to genetics and evolutionary
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theory (e.g., dominant allele, recessive allele, homozygous, heterozygous phenotype, genotype;
Department for Education, 2013b). Thus, all English school-aged children are exposed to the
cultural epistemology of evolutionary theory in somedetail.
Creationism. Another cultural epistemology, albeit from a supernatural perspective, is
creationism (Evans et al., 2010). Compared to US secondary school students, however, English
secondary school students (Tenenbaum, To, Wormald, & Pegram, 2015) and British science
museum visitors (Abraham-Silver & Kisiel, 2008) rarely invoke creationism. For this reason,
we will not discuss this theory further. Such variation in invoking creationism demonstrates that
the use of different epistemologies varywith culture (Evans et al., 2010).
Role of Culture
Indeed, ample evidence suggests that culture and socialization play an important role in the
way people reason about biological entities (Atran, Estin, Coley, & Medin, 1997, Atran, Medin,
Lynch, Vapnarsky, Ek’, & Sousa, 2001, Atran, Medin, & Ross, 2004; Bang &Medin, 2010; Sousa,
Atran, & Medin, 2004; Ross, Medin, Coley, & Atran, 2002; Waxman, Medin, & Ross, 2007). In a
study examining three distinct populations that varied depending on the amount of contact they had
with the natural world, Ross et al. (2002) found that 6- to 10-year-old children from the three groups
adopted very different ways of reasoning when thinking about biological entities. While
anthropomorphic thinking was specific to urban children who had the least contact with natural
world, ecological thinking (reasoning based on relationship between two and more unique entities)
was most characteristic of Native American children, who had the most contact with natural world.
Furthermore, while there is evidence of anthropomorphic thinking in children from rural majority
cultures, this type of reasoning ceases to exist in their thinking by the time children are 10 years old.
Cultures need not be drastically different from one another for effects of culture and
socialization to take hold. Kelemen (2003) examined British and American children’s use of
teleological reasoning when reasoning about natural phenomena. Given that both the UK and the
US are similar in terms of industrialization (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2005) and that
teleological thinking is universal among children from western urbanized cultures, one would
expect little difference in the way teleological thinking is endorsed. However, what Kelemen
(2003) found was that while children from both countries endorsed teleological reasoning, they
did so in a slightly different manner. Specifically, while American children tended to regard body
parts as possessing both biological self-serving and artifact-like social functions, British children
tended to favor self-serving survival-enhancing function for selected body parts (e.g., neck and
feet). Kelemen (2003) argued that the different ways in which British and American children use
teleological reasoning may be because British adults tended to be less open about publically
endorsing religious explanations. Furthermore, the nuanced difference between the two cultures
may mean that children are either more or less likely to be exposed to statements supporting
intelligent design depending on the majority culture where they are raised (Kelemen, 2003).
Because there are differences between British and American children’s foundational knowledge
about biological entities, we expect that in extrapolating their early understandings about
biological entities, British young people’s reasoning about evolutionwill also differ.
Conceptual Conflict and Conceptual Change
How students integrate new information learned in the science classroom into their pre-
existing epistemologies depends on whether or not students detect the inconsistencies between
those epistemologies and the one proposed by the scientific community (Chinn & Brewer, 1993;
Posner, Strike,Hewson,&Gertzog, 1982). In instanceswhere students do not detect a discrepancy
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between their alternative understanding and the normative explanation, learners’ knowledge may
likely comprise a collection of individual pieces of knowledge (see diSessa, Gillespie, & Esterly,
2004). However, if students detect the discrepancy between their personal understanding and the
normative explanation, students can respond to the information by: (i) ignoring the contradictions
and continuing to use pre-existing conceptions in evolutionary reasoning; (ii) maintaining pre-
existing conceptions and using newand old conceptions in parallel, such as in co-existencemodels
(Evans et al., 2010); or (iii) constructing a new conceptual framework incorporating both na€ıve
and scientific ideas into a single conception (Kuhn, 1989; Nehm &Ha, 2011). However, because
past research on participants younger than 18 years has not generally coded students’ response to
allow for their use of multiple epistemologies, it is uncertain to what extent students adopt each
strategy when reasoning about biological evolution. Thus, our study extends work on multiple
epistemologies conducted byEvans et al.
The Current Study
The aim of the current study is to determine the ways in which young people in England reason
about biological evolution. Though past research has indicated that there are commonalities in the
way people reason about evolution that cut across cultures (Abraham-Silver & Kisiel, 2008), there
are also differences in children’s reasoning about biology in these culture (Kelemen, 2003) that
could lead to differences in the way they reason about biological evolution. Indeed, a recent study
exploring English secondary school students’ reasoning about evolution before and after a visit to a
natural history museum suggested that students very rarely invoked creationist explanations when
reasoning about evolution (Tenenbaum et al., 2015). This finding is in contrast to research
conducted in the American Midwest/Southern US which suggests that many adult museum visitors
endorse creationist explanations when reasoning about evolution (Evans et al., 2010). Though the
study conducted by Tenenbaum et al. (2015) is not a comparison study, it highlights the need for
taking a new look at how young people in England reason about evolution today.
Unlike previous work that has focused on students’ endorsement of specific evolutionary
concepts (Beardsley, 2004; Clough & Wood-Robinson, 1985; Deadman & Kelly, 1978), or
students’ endorsement of either Lamarckian or Darwinian theory of evolution (Banet & Ayuso,
2003; Geraedts&Boersma, 2006), this study examines developmental trends in secondary school
students’ reasoning about evolution, in particular, their use of target-dependent reasoning. Past
studies have not coded students’ answers allowing for the use of multiple epistemologies and as a
result, may have overestimated the coherence of young people’s understandings of the
evolutionary theory. The present study remedies this by using a different type of coding scheme. In
addition, past coding schemes, such as the one used by Evans et al. (2010), have coded the use of
words like evolution and adaptation as evidence that people correctly understood evolutionary
theory. However, one could use these words to denote a prior conception based on na€ıve concepts
(Demastes, Good, & Peebles, 1996). For this reason, we used a stricter coding scheme where the
mere mention of these terms was not considered evidence of evolutionary understanding.
Furthermore, the majority of studies investigating students’ emerging understandings about
evolution have been conducted in the US (Beardsley, 2004; Bishop &Anderson, 1990; Clough &
Wood-Robinson, 1985; Demastes et al., 1995; Jensen & Finley, 1995, 1996; Kampourakis &
Zogza, 2008; Nehm & Reilly, 2007; Nehm & Ridgway, 2011; Settlage, 1994; Shtulman, 2006).
Our study extends thework of Evans et al. (2010) by specifically focusing on participants between
the ages of 12 and 16, a timewhen based on the National Curriculum in England (Department for
Education, 2013a, 2013b), students would need to negotiate their understandings of evolution.
Understanding how students in England develop knowledge about evolution is necessary to for a
more complete view.
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Based on past research on secondary school students’ (Banet & Ayuso, 2003; Beardsley,
2004; etc.), and adult museum visitors’ reasoning about evolution (Diamond & Evans, 2007;
Evans et al., 2010), it is expected that: (i) intuitive concepts will be endorsed by students at all
age levels; (ii) older students will have access to more scientific concepts about evolution, and
thus will incorporate these concepts more frequently into their explanations about species
change than younger students; (iii) students will exhibit target-dependent reasoning in that they
will alter the way they reason about evolution based on the entity discussed. Specifically,
(iv) students will be more likely to reject evolution when discussing human evolution than
other the evolution of other species. Finally, we explore differences between our coding scheme
and a previous one based on Evans et al. (2010).
Method
Participants and School Characteristics
One-hundred and six students from four state comprehensive schools and one independent
school inLondon and Surrey,UKwere recruited. Therewere 39 students at age 12 (M¼ 12 years 4
months, SD¼ 2.7 months; 18 girls, 21 boys), 31 students at age 14 (M¼ 14 years 5 months,
SD¼ 3.7 months; 17 girls, 14 boys), and 36 students at age 16 (M¼ 16 years 6 months, SD¼ 3.5
months; 17 girls, 19 boys). Since both science and religious education are part of the mandatory
National Curriculum in England as set out by the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority
(Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, 2004), we sampled students from these two subjects.
No age group was selected from one school only. We interviewed ten 14-year olds and nineteen
16-year olds from School A, eleven 14-year olds and seventeen 16-year olds from School B,
sixteen 12-year olds and eight 14-year olds from School C, ten 12-year olds and two 14-year olds
fromSchoolD, and thirteen 12-year olds fromSchool E. The percentage of students achievingfive
GCSEs2 grade A to C for each of the schools respectively are 56%, 65%, 53%, 83%, and 84%.
The catchment areas of the schools also varied in socio-economic status. Thus, the academic
performance of students in each school varied and we are confident that students from a wide
variety of academic and socio-economic backgroundswere included in this study.
Information about students’ religious affiliation was not collected, because the schools in
whichwe interviewed students did notwant us to ask about religiosity. The schools considered this
question to be a personal question.
Procedure and Protocol
Consent to approach students in school was obtained first from the principal, then parental
opt-out letters were sent home requesting parents to return letters if they did not want students to
participate. There were no cases of parental opt-out. Finally, student verbal assent was also
required for participation. Each participant engaged in a one-to-one semi-structured interview
that lasted approximately 15minutes.
InterviewProtocol.Uponmeeting with the students, the researcher introduced herself, and
gave a brief overview of the study. Each participant gave further verbal assent before
commencing the interview. One student did not agree to take part in the study. Students who
agreed to take part answered all questions asked by the researcher. Each participant was asked
15 questions by the researcher, of which five questions are addressed in this study (see Table 1).
The remainder of the questions will be investigated in a separate report, and therefore will not
be reported in this study. The five questions explored in this study investigate students’
reasoning about species origins (how did the Tasmanian tigers come to be in Tasmania?, why
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Table 1
Examples of most common student responses
Interview Question Examples of Student Responses and Codes
The last Tasmanian tigers died in the 1930s, the
species is now extinct. This was a marsupial
animal, like Kangaroos are marsupials for example.
This animal also looked like a wolf and had stripes
on its back. Why do you think the wolf like
marsupials could only be found in Tasmania?
“Maybe they have adapted to that place, so they can
only really survive there . . . Um, they have kind of
grown up living with different plants and stuff so
they know where they have to be during the day,
where they have to be during the night what they
eat, what they can not eat.” (Alex, age 14)
CODE: novice naturalistic reasoning
In the next hundreds of years, because of global
warming, the ice caps are going to melt. The Arctic
will be much warmer than the seals are used to,
what will happen to the seals do you think?
“Um, I think they will probably start to run out, they
would have to swim for longer because there is no
ice. I think they would either find somewhere else,
but I think most of them, they will not survive.”
(Kenny, age 14)
CODE: mixed informed (extinction)/novice
naturalistic reasoning
“Um, maybe they would have to go to a different
ocean, a colder one that they could survive in. They
may have to go to snowier places.” (Izzy, age 12)
CODE: novice naturalistic reasoning
The Galapagos Islands are located off the coast of
South America. On one of these islands, scientists
have been studying one kind of finch. They
measured the size of the finches’ beaks. On the first
trip to the island, they found that the beak of this
finch was on the small side. Then a severe drought
occurred on the island and it wiped out most of the
plants that make the small seeds that the finches
feed on. The only seeds that were really common
were the tough ones that require a large beak to
open. Then the scientists came back a few years
later and measured the beaks again. This time, they
found that the beaks of this finch were on the large
side. How can you explain that on the return trip to
the island, larger beaks were found on more of the
finches?
“Because they needed bigger beaks to eat the stuff.
Maybe the smaller beaks could not eat it, maybe
they were not strong enough. They were adapted to
that kind of seed so maybe only the big ones,
maybe they could adapt to them, so maybe only
they could survive. Say like they were smaller and
bigger ones. Maybe those smaller ones could
evolve into the bigger ones eventually, as time goes
on they could adapt to new stuff. Maybe they could
adapt to eat the bigger seeds.” (Leslie, age 14)
CODE: mixed informed/novice naturalistic
reasoning
“Probably because um, birds that were already
existing were smaller beaks tried to open them, and
then have kind of got through, but at the same time
have kind of adapted, like their beaks have grown
and then the birds are just born with bigger beaks.”
(Alex, age 14)
CODE: novice naturalistic reasoning
Scientists think the humans and chimps shared a
common ancestor as recently as 5 million years
ago. Describe how you think that both a chimp and
a human could arise from the same kind of
ancestor?
“Um, I think they are very alike, but I think they, does
not like the apes, we were apes and I think we kind
of separated. I do not know how, but we definitely
separated and they kind of lived in a different
environment to us. Separated from us.” (Victor,
age 14)
CODE: novice naturalistic reasoning
There are many types of algae in Yellowstone Lake;
however, scientists have found a kind of algae in
this lake that is not found anywhere else. These
algae first appeared 14,000 years ago, at that time,
the climate was warming. Describe how you think
that this new kind of algae came to be in
Yellowstone Lake?
“Bacteria could have evolved. I do not really know.”
(Rebecca, age 14)
CODE: novice naturalistic reasoning
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was a specific type of algae only found in one place [Yellowstone Lake]?, how do you think the
chimps and humans arose from the same kind of ancestor?), and natural selection (why were
the finches beaks larger on scientists’ return trip to the island?). One further question asked
students to predict the consequences for biological entities if global warming continues (if the
sea temperature continues to rise, what will happen to the seals?). The questions about the
finches, algae, and chimps have been used in many past studies on evolution (Diamond &
Evans, 2007; Evans et al., 2010; Spiegel et al., 2012). We created the questions about the seals
and the Tasmanian tigers to gauge students’ understanding of species-environment fit. The
seals question also tapped into students’ knowledge about extinction. After the interview,
the researcher thanked the participants for their time and asked if they had any questions for the
researcher. None of the students had any further questions or comments following
the interview. Each participating school received either a £100 donation or a talk from the
researcher about studying psychology in higher education.
Interviewswere transcribed and coded into threemain reasoning patterns. The coding system
is described below.
Coding Scheme. The coding system was adapted from Evans et al. (2010) with a change
described inmore detail at the beginning of the scoring section. The coding schemewas divided into
three categories: informed naturalistic reasoning (INR), novice naturalistic reasoning (NNR), and
denial of evolutionary reasoning (DR). These codeswere notmutually exclusive. Students could use
more than one type of reasoning simultaneously (e.g., INR/NNR,NNR/DR, etc.), which allowed for a
total of eight different reasoning pattern combinations: INR, NNR, DR, INR/NNR, INR/DR, INR/
NNR/DR, NNR/DR, and “don’t know.” The code “don’t know” was used only when participants
specifically stated “don’t know”orprovidednoalternative answers.Table2provides examples.
To test for reliability, two coders independently coded a subset (20%) of the transcripts, which is
recommended by Bakeman and Gottman (1997) in developmental psychology, Thorndike and
Thorndike-Christ (2011) in education research, and Neuendorf (2002) in media content analysis.
Neuendorf (2002) argues that at least 50 units or 10% should be coded. Twenty-percent of transcripts
were chosen at random to be coded. The logic behind attaining inter-rater reliability on 20% is similar
to the logic behind inferential statistics in that the kappa coefficient generalizes to the remaining
transcripts. Reliability was calculated using kappa coefficients. Kappa coefficients between 0.60
and 0.75 were considered good and over 0.75 was excellent (Fleiss, 1981). A kappa coefficient of
0.81 was achieved for all codes in these transcripts. The first author coded the remainder of
the transcripts. Next, the second author read each transcript in its entirety and examined the first
author’s coding to her coding. The second author agreed with the vast majority of the remaining
coding (98%). All disagreements were resolved through discussion. The codes were as follows:
InformedNaturalistic Reasoning (INR)
The scientificmodel of evolution is based onvariation, inheritance, selection, and time (Evans
et al., 2010). For students’ responses to be coded in this category, they needed to have alluded to
the idea that each living entity has evolved because of naturally occurring variations within a
population of species. These variations arise through genetic mutation or through genetic sexual
recombination; variations can be beneficial, harmful, or neutral to the survival of the individual.
Individuals that possess beneficial traits aremore likely to survive to reproduction age andproduce
offspring, whereas those that do not possess the traits are less likely to survive. Over time the
species population will havemore individuals who possess the beneficial traits. Species no longer
suited to the environment will become extinct. Concepts included in this category include
extinction, inheritance, evolution, and commonancestor.
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Table 2
Coding scheme definitions and examples
Concept Operational Definition Examples
Informed naturalistic reasoning
Extinction or death Reference to animals not being able
to adapt; or the specific mention of
extinction.
“The animal cannot adapt fast enough so
they die out.”
Inheritance Reference to traits or characteristics
being inherited. It is not sufficient
for the students to suggest that the
species will reproduce, but he/she
will also need to specify that a
certain trait has been passed on to
the next generation.
“. . . the big beaked birds will probably
reproduce, so they all have the genetic
characteristics of a bigger beaked. . .”
Evolution Reference to the underlying
mechanisms of evolution. If
students mention evolution without
an explanation, it will not be coded
in this category.
“Because all the small beaked birds
probably died out because they were
unable to get food, so the big beaked
birds will probably reproduce, so they
all have the genetic characteristics of a
bigger beaked. . .”
Common ancestor Mention that there were ancestors in
common and explain this.
“There was a third species that was
common to both the chimp and the
human”
Novice naturalistic reasoning
Static adaptation References to the organism-
environment fit.
“It is only adapted to living in the
conditions that are in Tasmania”
“The climate is right for them, and their
food is there.”
Intention The use of mental states to discuss
change.
“Because the seeds were tougher, they
need to develop bigger beaks to eat
them”
Similarity References to the similarity between
organisms.
“They look the same, like chimps have
five fingers, we have five fingers, they
can stand on two feet, we can too”
Reaction or mutated References to reactions to external
matter.
“Maybe because it reacted with the
chemicals in the lake, that is why they
(algae) are there”
Movement Animal moved somewhere either
through another organism, by its
own actions, or moved with the
land.
“Because the Tasmanian tigers were on
that bit of land when the Pangaea
separated, and they could not swim, so
that is why they were there”
Evolutionary term Use the words evolve, adapted,
adapted, adaptation, evolution
without providing further
explanation.
“The seals would adapt and evolve to live
in the environment”
Teleological Suggests that change occurs due to an
end-point.
“Because they needed to eat the seeds,
that is why their beaks were longer the
second time the scientist came back”
Essentialist References to the species having
always been there, references to
species stability.
“The algae has always been there, the
scientists just did not find it before”
Hybrid References to the interbreeding of
two unrelated species.
“Maybe a wolf and a tiger mated and that
is why you have the Tasmanian tiger”
Creationist reasoning
Denial Participant ejects information
provided by researcher.
“I do not think humans and chimps shared
a common ancestor”
Religious Where participant makes reference to
God or a supernatural being.
“Because God put them [Tasmanian
tigers] there”
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NoviceNaturalistic Reasoning (NNR)
This category captures reasoning patterns derived from intuitive evolutionary concepts. In
this conceptual framework, participants view individual animals as intentional agents who evolve
as and when needed for survival, or that individual animals change to suit the environment. This
reasoning pattern also includes responses where participants allude to essentialist (i.e.,
essentialism, movement) and teleological ideas (i.e., “humans won’t evolve anymore because
theyhave already reached the highest”).
Denial of EvolutionaryReasoning (DR)
This final category captures reasoning patterns whereby students make reference to a creator
or a supernatural being. There are two concepts in this reasoning category: rejection and religious.
The code rejection is used when participants rejected a piece of information provided by the
researcher (e.g., about the common ancestry of chimps and humans, “I don’t think that is true.”).
The code religious was used when students referenced God as the instigator of evolution (e.g.,
“Because God made it that way”). We did not label these codes as creationist reasoning because
few students invoked explicit creationism in their reasoning.
Scoring. One change was made to the original coding scheme. Evans et al. (2010) coded the
mere mention of the words adapt, evolution, evolve, etc. as informed naturalistic reasoning.
However, upon reading the transcripts in full, we saw that students frequently used these words
while referencing concepts from novice naturalistic reasoning. For example, one 16-year-old girl
used the term adapt, but then goes on to explain a teleological concept, “the drought caused the
bodies of the finches whowere living during the drought to adapt so they can have bigger beaks to
store more food in cases of drought perhaps”. Thus, we did not credit her with having informed
naturalistic reasoning. Instead, we coded students’ mere mention of such words as evolutionary
term, and categorized them as belonging to the novice naturalistic reasoning category. In another
interview, a student (male, age 14) answering the same question explained that the Galapagos
finches adapted to eat the seeds. However, when the interviewer asked the student what he meant
by “adapt,” the student endorsed a teleological stance:
Child: Because the seeds became bigger and harder, so then the beaks of the finches adapted
to it, so they could eat the seeds.
Interviewer:What do youmeanby adapt?
Child:Get used to the new food, so it can eat it.
If the above excerpt was coded following Evan’s coding scheme, the student would have been
coded as using both informed naturalistic reasoning (for using an evolutionary term) and novice
naturalistic reasoning (for endorsing teleological reasoning). However, with our new and more
stringent coding scheme, we only coded this student as using novice naturalistic reasoning. This is
because that we felt confident that the student did not have a normative understanding of the term
“adapt” following the researcher’s probing question. It is important to note, however, that the
youngest participants in Evans et al. (2010) were 18 years rather than 12 and would have been
more likely than our participants to use the vocabulary in a scientifically accurate manner. Thus,
our scheme is adapted for a younger agegroup.
When coding the interview transcripts, each of the reasoning categories was coded for
presence (1) or absence (0). Thus, for each coding category, participants were scored as either 0
or 1. First, to determine students’ use of multiple epistemologies, students’ endorsement of each
of the eight reasoning patterns was summed across the five questions ranging from aminimum of
0 (students did not use this type of reasoning in at all in answering the questions) to amaximumof
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5 (students used this type of reasoning consistently in all of the questions). Subsequently,
to determine the types of reasoning students endorsed for each question, the original scoring for
reasoning pattern (ranging from 0 to 1) was used. Finally, to contextualize our quantitative
findings,wewill provide representative examples of responses from interview conversations.
Results
Before testing our hypotheses statistically, we conducted a five (Question) eight (Type of
Response) ANCOVA with age group and school as a between-subjects variables to rule out
differences between schools. Therewas nomain effect of school nor were there interaction effects
between school and any of the variables. Thus, we can rule out school effects that could hinder our
ability to generalize beyond these schools. To increase statistical power and test our hypotheses,
we next conducted a five (Question) eight (Type of Response) ANOVA with age group as a
between-subject variable.We usedmixed designANOVAmodels becausewewanted to be able to
examine the use of reasoning types across the five questions for each participant. Entering three
factors into the mixed-design ANOVA also protected the alpha level. Analysis of variance
(ANOVA)modelswere used to analyze dichotomous data. These procedures are preferable to log-
linear analytical procedures when analyzing dichotomous and repeated measures designs (see
Wainryb, Shaw, Laupa, & Smith, 2001). Moreover, ANOVA can be used with dichotomous data
when the degrees of freedom for the error terms are greater than 40 (Lunney, 1970). Bonferroni
post hoc tests were used to explore significant effects. Where assumptions of sphericity were not
met because of a significant Mauchly’s test, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected results are reported.
Finally, only significant main effects and interactions are reported, partial eta squared h2p
 
was
used to calculate the effect size for ANOVA effects, and Cohen’s d (d) was used to calculate effect
sizes for all pairwise post-hoc comparisons. Cohen’s ds between 0.20 and 0.50 indicate a small
effect size, Cohen’s ds between 0.50 and 0.80 indicate a medium effect, and ds greater than 0.80
indicate a large effect (Cohen, 1988). Figure 1 shows the means of the different types of reasons
used by each agegroup.
Multiple Epistemologies
To determine whether participants used target-dependent epistemologies in their explan-
ations as would be expected by the third hypothesis, a five (Question) eight (Type of
Reason) three (Age) repeated-measures ANOVAwas conducted. Findings indicate a significant
effect of Type of Reason, F(7, 707)¼ 331.57, p< 0.001, hp2¼ 0.77, an interaction of Question
Type of Reason, F(28, 2828)¼ 20.46, p< 0.001 hp2¼ 0.17, and a three-way interaction of
QuestionType ofReasonAge,F(56, 2828)¼ 1.54,p¼ 0.009,hp2¼ 0.03.
To follow up on themain effect of Type of Reason, Bonferonni post-hoc tests were conducted
and revealed that students of all ages were more likely to endorse NNR (M¼ 3.38, SD¼ 1.10),
than all other reasoning patterns (INR/NNR, M¼ 0.63, SD¼ 0.70, t(103)¼ 18.32, p¼ 0.0001,
d¼ 2.98; DK, M¼ 0.39, SD¼ 0.72, t(103)¼ 18.64, p¼ 0.0001, d¼ 3.21; INR, M¼ 0.38,
SD¼ 0.58, t(103)¼ 22.52, p¼ 0.0001, d¼ 3.40; DR, M¼ 0.12, SD¼ 0.38, t(103)¼ 25.58,
p¼ 0.0001, d¼ 3.95; NNR/DR, M¼ 0.11, SD¼ 0.34, t(103)¼ 27.05, p¼ 0.0001, d¼ 4.00;
INR/DR and INR/NNR/DR, M¼ 0.00, SD¼ 0.00, t(103)¼ 31.32, p¼ 0.0001, d¼ 4.33). Thus,
NNRwas by far the most typical reasoning pattern for all ages, which supports the first hypothesis
that all age groups would rely on novice naturalistic reasoning. Second, students weremore likely
to rely on combined INR/NNR in their answers than DK, t(103)¼ 2.27, p¼ 0.03, d¼ 0.33,
INR, t(103)¼ 2.36, p¼ 0.02, d¼ 0.38, DR, t(103)¼ 6.49, p¼ 0.0001, d¼ 0.91, NNR/DR,
t(103)¼ 6.83, p¼ 0.0001, d¼ 0.95, INR/NNR/DR, t(103)¼ 9.11, p¼ 0.0001, d¼ 1.27, or
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INR/DR, t(103)¼ 9.11, p¼ 0.0001, d¼ 1.27. Third, students gave “don’t know” responses more
than DR, t(103)¼ 3.83, p¼ 0.0001, d¼ 0.47, NNR/DR, t(103)¼ 3.64, p¼ 0.0001, d¼ 0.51,
INR/NNR/DR, t(103)¼ 5.61, p¼ 0.0001, d¼ 0.77, or INR/DR, t(103)¼ 5.61, p¼ 0.0001,
d¼ 0.77. The use of “don’t know” and INR did not differ, t(103)¼ 0.10, p¼ 0.92. Fourth, students
used INRmore thanDR, t(103)¼ 3.85, p¼ 0.0001, d¼ 0.55,NNR/DR, t(103)¼ 4.21, p¼ 0.0001,
d¼ 0.58, INR/NNR/DR, t(103)¼ 6.77, p¼ 0.0001, d¼ 0.94, or INR/DR, t(103)¼ 6.77,
p¼ 0.0001, d¼ 0.94. Finally, DR was used more often than, INR/NNR/DR, t(103)¼ 3.12,
p¼ 0.002, d¼ 0.43, or INR/DR, t(103)¼ 3.12, p¼ 0.002, d¼ 0.43. Students’ endorsement of
DR did not differ from their use of NNR/DR, t(103)¼ 0.19, p¼ 0.85. INR/NNR/DR and INR/DR
were never used. See Figure 1 for use of the different reasons across agegroups.
Next we followed up on the two- and three-way interactions related to our hypotheses. We
examined each type of reasoning separately, and report age effects where significant to understand
better the QuestionType of ReasonAge and QuestionType of Reason interaction effects.
The finding from these analyses demonstrated the ways in which participants varied in their
reasoning based on the question they were answering. Findings are reported in order of most to
least endorsed reasoning type.
Figure 1. Mean of students’ endorsement of each type of reasoning by age. [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com].
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Novice Naturalistic Reasoning
To examine students’ endorsement of novice naturalistic reasoning, a five(Question) three
(Age) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted for NNR. Results indicated that there was a
main effect of Question in students’ endorsement of NNR, F(4, 404)¼ 25.56, p< 0.001,
hp
2¼ 0.20. A Bonferroni post hoc test indicated that the questions about the tigers and algaewere
more likely to evoke NNR than the question about the seals (tiger-seal comparison, p< 0.001,
d¼ 1.19, algae-seal comparison, p< 0.001, d¼ 1.12) and the finches (tiger-finch comparison,
p< 0.001, d¼ 0.63; seal-finch comparison, p< 0.001, d¼ 0.58). Students were least likely to
use NNR when discussing the seals (seal-human comparison, p< 0.001, d¼ 0.47). Students’
endorsement of NNR for tiger and algae did not differ from each other p¼ 1.00, d¼ 0.05). Once
again, there was no main effect of age in students’ endorsement of NNR, F(2, 101)¼ 0.48,
p¼ 0.62, hp2¼ 0.01, indicating that participants in all age groups were equally likely to endorse
novice naturalistic reasoning. Nor was there a significant interaction of Question  Age, F(8,
404)¼ 0.88, p¼ 0.53,hp2¼ 0.02.
Informed/Novice Naturalistic Reasoning
To examine students’ endorsement of INR/NNR, a five(Question) three (Age) repeated-
measures ANOVAwas conducted and found a main effect of Question, F(2.34, 235.97)¼ 37.59,
p< 0.001, hp
2¼ 0.27. A Bonferroni post hoc test indicated that students were most likely to
endorse INR/NNR when discussing the seals than all other entities (seal-finch comparison,
p< 0.001, d¼ 0.25, seal-tiger comparison, p< 0.001, d¼ 1.00, seal-chimp/human comparison,
p< 0.001, d¼ 1.09, and seal-algae comparison, p< 0.001, d¼ 1.11). Participants were alsomore
likely to endorse this type of reasoning when discussing the finches than the chimps/humans
(p¼ 0.01, d¼ 0.43), and the algae (p¼ 0.01, d¼ 0.43). Students’ endorsement of INR/NNR was
not significantly different from each other for the tigers, the chimps/humans, and the algae (see
Table 3). The interaction between Question  Age was not significant, F(4.67, 235.97)¼ 1.12,
p¼ 0.352, hp2¼ 0.02. Nor was there a main effect of age, F(2, 101)¼ 2.83, p¼ 0.06, hp2¼ 0.05,
thus indicating that students of all ages are equally likely to use INR/NNR in their answers.
Informed Naturalistic Reasoning
To determine whether or not student’s endorsement of INR varied by question, a
five(Question) three (Age) repeated-measures ANOVAwas conducted for INR. Themain effect
for age was not significant, F(2, 101)¼ 1.36, p¼ 0.26, hp2¼ 0.03. Findings, however, indicate
that therewas a significant effect of Question,F(2.36, 238.27)¼ 11.69, p< 0.001, hp2¼ 0.10, and
a significant interaction of QuestionAge, F(4.72, 238.27)¼ 2.75, p¼ 0.022, hp2¼ 0.05,
suggesting that students’ endorsement of informed naturalistic reasoning varied both by question
and by age of the participant. A Bonferroni post hoc test suggested that students were more likely
to endorse INR when answering the question about the seals than the question about the tigers
(p< 0.001, d¼ 0.62), the chimps/humans (p¼ 0.002, d¼ 0.52), and the algae (p< 0.001,
d¼ 0.62). They were also more likely to endorse INR when discussing the finches than the tigers
(p¼ 0.002, d¼ 0.51), the chimps/humans (p¼ 0.02, d¼ 0.40), and the algae (p¼ 0.002,
d¼ 0.51). Participants’ endorsement of INR for the questions about the finches and the seals were
not significantly different from each other, nor were participants’ endorsement of INR for tigers,
chimps/humans, and algae (see Table 3). To follow up on the significant QuestionAge
interaction, five one-way ANOVAs were calculated comparing the three age groups across each
question separately, with a protected p-value of 0.01 (0.05 divided by 5). Only the question about
the finches reached significance, F(2, 105)¼ 5.28, p¼ 0.007, hp2¼ 0.09. As predicted by
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hypothesis 2, findings indicate that 16-year-old students were more likely than 12-year-old
students to endorse INR, t(42.97)¼ 3.15, p¼ 0.003, d¼ 1.61.
Denial of Evolutionary Reasoning
Similarly, students’ endorsement of denial of evolutionary reasoning was analyzed using a
five(Question) three (Age) repeated-measures ANOVA. The analysis revealed an effect of
Question in students’ endorsement of DR, F(1.75, 176.77)¼ 5.85, p¼ 0.005, hp2¼ 0.06. A
Bonferroni post hoc test indicated that students were more likely to endorse DR when discussing
the chimps/humans than the seals (p¼ 0.04, d¼ 0.45) questions. Participants’ endorsement ofDR
did not differ for the question about the tigers, seals, finch, or algae (all ps¼ 1.00). There was no
QuestionAge effect of students’ endorsement of DR, F(3.50, 176.77)¼ 2.13, p¼ 0.089,
hp
2¼ 0.04 norwas there a significantmain effect ofAge,F(2, 101)¼ 1.08,p¼ 0.34,hp2¼ 0.02.
Mixed Novice Naturalistic/Denial of Evolutionary Reasoning and Other Mixed
Reasoning Patterns
Finally, to examine students’ endorsement ofmixedNNR/DR, a five(Question) three (Age)
repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted. The ANOVA model revealed a main effect of
Question, F(2.26, 228.50)¼ 3.29, p¼ 0.03, hp2¼ 0.03. However, the Bonferroni post hoc test did
not indicate any significant differences in students’ endorsement of this type of reasoning pattern
for the different questions. Other mixed reasoning patterns (INR/NNR/DR, INR/DR) were not
explored as nonewere endorsed by anyof the participants.
“Don’t Know”. Since “don’t know” responses made up a significant proportion (39.4%) of
student responses, wewill also explore how these are distributed across questions and age groups.
Once again, a repeated-measures ANOVA for DK was conducted for the five questions, and
revealed a significant interaction ofQuestionAge,F(7.04, 356.06)¼ 2.17, p¼ 0.04,hp2¼ 0.04.
To follow up on this interaction, five one-way ANOVAs were conducted comparing the three age
groups across each question separately, with a protected p-value of 0.01 (0.5 divided by 5). Only
the question on finches reached significance, F(2, 106)¼ 5.64, p¼ 0.005, d¼ 0.10. A Bonferroni
post hoc test indicated that 12-year oldsweremore likely than 14- (p¼ 0.04, d¼ 0.53) and 16-year
olds (p¼ 0.007,d¼ 0.69) to respondwith “I don’t know” for the finchquestion.
Comparison Between Evan’s et al. (2010) Coding Scheme and the New One
To examine whether there were differences based on the changes we made to the coding
scheme,we conducted analyses using the original Evans’s et al. (2010) scheme.Wefirst compared
our codes to Evans’s more explicitly. As expected, INR (M¼ 0.84, SD¼ 0.92) and INR/NNR
(M¼ 1.45, SD¼ 1.06)were codedmore frequentlywith Evans’s coding scheme thanwith the new
coding scheme, t(101)¼ 6.28, p¼ 0.0001, d¼ 0.60 and t(101)¼ 7.89, p¼ 0.0001, d¼ 0.91,
respectively. In contrast, NNR (M¼ 1.83, SD¼ 1.16) was coded less frequently with the new
coding scheme than with the old coding scheme, t(101)¼ 12.52, p¼ 0.0001, d¼ 1.37. Thus, in
adoptingmore stringent criteria in the newcoding scheme,more studentswere classified as novice
naturalistic reasoners than informed naturalistic reasoners than if we had used the old coding
scheme (Evans et al., 2010).
Next, we conducted the main analyses of a three (Age)five (Question) eight (Type of
Reasoning) ANOVA using the original scheme. First, with the coding based on Evans, there
continued to be a difference in Type of Reason,F(3, 265)¼ 331.57, p¼ 0.001, hp2¼ 0.77, as there
was in the new coding scheme. Whereas NNR was the most frequently used reason with the new
scheme, NNR (M¼ 1.83, SD¼ 1.16) and INR/NNR (M¼ 1.46, SD¼ 1.06) were used with equal
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frequency. INR/NNR continued to be endorsed more often than the other codes. INRwas the next
most frequently used code (M¼ 0.85, SD¼ 0.92).
Second, we examined age effects. There was a significant Type of ReasoningAge effect,
F(6, 300)¼ 3.23, p¼ 0.004, hp2¼ 0.06. To examine this further, we conducted three separate one-
way ANOVAs with age as an independent variable on NNR, INR, and INR/NNR (we would not
have expected differences on DK and DR because the coding schemes were identical for these
codes and codes combined withDRwere so rare that wewould not expect effects). In terms of age
effects, remember that there were no main effects for age with the new coding scheme. However,
with the Evans’ scheme, there was a main effect of age on INR, F(2, 101)¼ 3.59, p¼ 0.03,
d¼ 0.59, with 16 year olds (M¼ 1.14, SD¼ 1.13) using INR more frequently than 12 year olds
(M¼ 0.58, SD¼ 0.72). In contrast, 12 year olds (M¼ 2.26, SD¼ 1.13) usedNNRmore frequently
than 16-year olds (M¼ 1.52, SD¼ 1.23), F(2, 101)¼ 4.59, p¼ 0.01, d¼ 0.62. Fourteen year-old
students did not differ from the other two age groups in their use of INR (M¼ 0.83, SD¼ 0.79) or
NNR (M¼ 1.63, SD¼ 0.96). Finally, using Evans’s coding scheme, there was no significant age
effect of INR/NNR,F (2, 102)< 1.3
Summary. In sum, fewer students were classified as having used informed naturalistic
reasoning when using the new coding scheme than when using Evans’s coding scheme. In
contrast, more students were classified as having used novice naturalistic reasoning when using
the new coding scheme than Evans’s coding scheme. The key difference between the two coding
scheme is that whereas Evans’s considers themeremention of the terms evolve/evolution/adapt as
evidence of having an informed naturalistic understanding, we did not. Students were considered
to have an informed naturalistic understanding only if theywere able to explain the relevant terms
in that context. Because two different coding schemes were used to analyze the same dataset,
differences as a result of the separate analyses must therefore be because of differences in the
coding schemes. That fewer students were classified as having used informed naturalistic
reasoning when using the new coding scheme than when using Evans’s coding scheme suggests
that Evans and colleagues may have overestimated the proportion of people using informed
naturalistic reasoning in their study.
Qualitative Changes in Students’ Reasoning About Evolution by Age
After conducting our quantitative analysis, we went back through our transcripts to confirm
that the patterns we found quantitatively were apparent in our transcripts. Again, we found clear
qualitative differences in the way students from the three age groups reasoned about evolution.
Whereas students in the youngest age cohort focused on surface features to help them reason about
evolution (e.g., the relationship between beak size and size of the seeds), older students’ responses
incorporated more evolutionary terms (e.g., evolve, adapt, mutated; see Table 4), suggesting an
attempt to reason about the mechanism of change. A further investigation into the pattern of
change revealed that it is at age 14 that students begin to incorporate relevant terminology in their
responses. That younger students focused onmore surface features when answering the questions
is in linewith the research byNehm andRidgway (2011)who found that novicesweremore likely
than experts to focus on surface features when solving evolutionary problems. Furthermore,
because 14-year olds have had more instruction about evolution in school science than 12-year
olds, we can attribute this change in part to students progressing through theNational Curriculum.
However, a careful reading of 14-year olds’ responses reveals that while they have appropriated
the relevant terminology in their responses, they have yet to grasp the conceptual meaning
conveyed by the terminology. Students’ misinterpretation of relevant terminology may have
contributed to older students’ continued biases about evolutionary processes.
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Only a subset of 16-year olds developed a scientific understanding about biological evolution
(Table 4). The more advanced reasoning exhibited by a minority of 16-year olds can be attributed
to the more elaborate content being taught in classrooms. For example, students are taught that
variation can be traced back to genes, heredity is a biological process, and some species share a
common ancestor (Ryan, 2014). As students learn about evolution in greater depth, we also find an
increase in students’ use of these concepts (e.g., survival of the fittest, species environment fit, and
species change over time). However, similar to the pattern we have seen among the 14-year olds,
many 16-year olds also failed to grasp the scientific definition of the relevant terms introduced in
the science classroom (seeAnirudh inTable 4). Itmaybe that students’ earliermisinterpretation of
relevant terminology contributed to their continued misunderstandings about evolutionary
processes. Rather than thinking about how environmental changes contribute to species changes
within a population, some students assume that evolutionary changes occur at the individual level
where individuals have direct control over gene mutation. For example, Harshil (age 16, Table 4)
Table 4
Qualitative examples of students’ responses to the question about the Galapagos finches
Age Group Example Response
Age 12 “Well, larger finches probably migrated to the island and the smaller finches were slightly
driven off yeah.” (Alex)
“Maybe they can eat more food and they can get bigger things into their mouths.” (Elena)
“Um, maybe what the plants that they have been eating has helped their beaks to grow?”
(Jessica)
Age 14 “Maybe the beaks needed to be big to eat the seeds because it was so tough. So the beaks
had to grow in a way. And like yeah, their beaks had to be adapted to eat the only food
that they can find.” (Abdurauf)
“Um, maybe it’s adapt to the way they eat or how they get food to feed themselves (. . .)
Like I live in a cold country, so I need to adapt myself to live in that country. I have to
wear like big coats and stuff, so they probably adapt themselves to eat that kind of stuff.”
(Francis)
“Um, because they, they must have been cracking the seeds. And over time, when they
give birth to more of the finches, their beaks got longer and bigger.” (Aaron)
“Their beaks had to grow larger to fit the seeds in. So um, they would have evolution, they
had evolution, their beaks have grown.” (Ashley)
Age 16 “Um, because I think . . . because the birds with the smaller beaks were not as successful as
the birds with the bigger beaks in getting the food and everything so the ones with the
smaller beaks died out and the ones with the larger beaks carried on reproducing.”
(Roshni)
“The larger beaks were the ones that were probably best adapted to the area. They were
the ones that were best at finding food . . ., so whilst other ones were not good at finding
food. While the other ones that were good at finding food, they would mate faster and
then they would not be hungry and their mates would probably still be alive because they
did not run out of food.” (Benjamin)
“They adapted, um, they pass on their genes and the genes mutated to allow the beaks to
become larger to be able to eat the seeds . . . So the genes mutated to make the beaks
larger. (Harshil)
“Um, they probably adapted as well, to have longer beaks, because things probably
changed there . . . Like if they had smaller beaks and they could not survive in that habitat,
so they needed to have bigger beaks, I guess . . . (Interviewer: Okay, so how did they come
to have bigger beaks?) . . . Um, by natural selection . . . They like, each generation have
like longer beaks and are better suited to the habitats, and that’s how they got bigger
beaks. (Interviewer: Okay. And how did the next generation have larger beaks?) . . . Um, I
don’t know.” (Anirudh)
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proposed that the finches adapted to the harder seeds by mutating to have larger beaks. He also
proposed that this mutation happens at the gene level and would be passed on to the next
generation. Here, Harshil draws on cultural knowledge learned in the science classroom from the
teaching of evolutionary theory, which includes relevant terminology, the understanding that
mutation occurs at the gene level, and that genes are inherited from one generation to the next. He
combines information from his newly represented epistemology with his prior na€ıve theory of
biology (teleology) in a coexistencemodel.
In another example, Anirudh (age 16, Table 4) again constructed his response based on
multiple epistemologies, however, his reasoning is less well integrated than Harshil’s. First,
Anirudh acknowledged that the finches with smaller beaks would not survive, and that to survive,
finches would need bigger beaks. When the interviewer repeated the original question how the
finches on theGalapagos Islands came to have bigger beaks, Anirudh responded by incorporating
relevant terminology (e.g., natural selection). However, it was clear from his response that he did
not have a causalmechanistic explanation for the change.
In sum, our qualitative analysis suggests that as students learnmore about evolution as part of
the mandatory National Curriculum, they incorporate their new understandings about evolution
into their existing reasoning patterns. However, students’ misinterpretation of key words (e.g.,
adapt, change, evolve, etc.) meant that their reasoning about evolution was inherently flawed
allowing them to retain their representations of their na€ıve theories. Early misinterpretation of
relevant terminology at age 14 may have contributed students’ erroneous reasoning about
evolution. The resulting conceptual structure at age 16 is an amalgamation of students’ prior
knowledge and discrete pieces of information recalled from school science.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to understand developmental changes in secondary school
students’ reasoning about evolution.We followed a procedure similar to the one outlined in Evans
et al. (2010), with one notable change. Whereas Evans et al. (2010) coded participants’ mere
mention of the terms evolve or adapt as evidence of informed naturalistic reasoning, participants
in our study also needed to be able to explain these terms in context to be considered using
informed naturalistic reasoning. Following this coding procedure, despite older students being
more able than younger students to apply scientific concepts to their evolutionary reasoning of
some entities (partial support for hypothesis 2), the majority of participants at all age groups
continued to endorse novice naturalistic reasoning more than any other reason (hypothesis 1).
Furthermore, there was evidence that students used different types of reasoning when answering
the five questions (hypothesis 3). Specifically, students were more likely to endorse scientific
concepts when reasoning about the seals and finches than about humans, algae, and tigers. Finally,
students were more likely to endorse denial of evolutionary reasoning for the question about the
chimps/humans than the seals; no other effect of students’ endorsement of denial of evolutionary
reasoningwas found (hypothesis 4).
Findings in this study echo that of past research in that secondary school students’
understandings about evolution are largelyunderdevelopedandguidedby their intuitive reasoning
(Bishop & Anderson, 1990; Clough & Wood-Robinson, 1985; Evans et al., 2010). Our findings
are in linewith research by Beggrow and Nehm (2012) that increased exposure to more advanced
content is insufficient in helping students build more expert-like understandings about evolution.
Perhaps the most important contribution of this research is the development of a more stringent
coding scheme. By using a coding scheme that coded for students’ conceptual understandings
rather than their use of evolutionary terms, this study was able to describe age differences in
secondary school students’ conceptual understandings of evolutionary processes. Furthermore,
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because our coding scheme allowed formore than one type of reasoning pattern to be coded, there
was evidence to suggest that students’ preference for certain types of reasoning when thinking
about biological evolutionwas already present by age 12. Let us further explore the role of relevant
terminology in students’ reasoning about evolution and also patterns in students’ use of multiple
epistemologies.
Learning Relevant Terminology Toward Greater Evolutionary Understanding
As detailed above, students frequently attach teleological or intentional definitions to
evolutionary terms such as adapt and evolve. Within our sample, students also tended to use
change interchangeable with adapt and evolve. Students’ misuse of scientific terminology is
commonplace, especially for novice learners (Nehm, Rector, &Ha, 2010; Rector, Nehm,&Pearl,
2013; Ryan, 1985). Acquiring expert knowledge of relevant terms, concepts, and processes is a
gradual process (Rector et al., 2013). Using appropriate language can help learners structure their
thoughts so that they are more able to reason about problems in a scientifically appropriate way.
Figures 2 and 3 are examples of students’ explanations before and after they learn the relevant
terminology. In Figure 2, we see that students recognize that there is a relationship between the
size of the finches’ beaks and the size of the seeds that they eat, however, their explanations of how
the change occurred relied mainly on intuitive explanations (e.g., moving away, digging deeper
into the ground, nutrients causing the beaks to grow). In contrast, 14- and 16-year olds used
relevant language to structure their explanation. For example, Auhamud (Figure 3) started his
answer by stating “adaptation”. But when the researcher asked what he meant by adaptation, he
cited his source in biology and extended what he thought was the correct interpretation to the new
problem.Also from this response, it is clear thatAuhamud’smisunderstanding did not arise during
the transfer phase. Instead, Auhamud’s misconception was a result of his endorsement of a
colloquial rather than a scientific understanding of the term adaptation. Nevertheless, comparing
Auhamud’s response and those typical of 12-year olds, students who have learned the relevant
terminology focused on the process of change, either at the individual level or at the population
Figure 2. Evolutionary reasoningwith relevant language.
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level. Figures 2 and 3 show examples of reasoning patterns before and after students learned the
relevant terminology.
Being able to use relevant language in theway it is intended is central to science learning (Ryan,
1985). Learning the relevant language has the potential to help students establish and organize their
conceptual understanding of the topic (Lemke, 1990). Indeed, confusing scientific terms with
colloquial ones and vice versa is common in science learning (Lemke, 1990). When students first
learn about a scientific concept, theywill grasp the semantic and conceptual relationships first before
learning the relevantwords (Lemke,1990).However, inour study, students’ colloquial interpretations
of relevant terms seemed to have hindered students’ representation of the intended scientific
interpretation. Considering thatmany students at all levels have difficulty using evolutionary terms in
an appropriate manner, a coding scheme that did not consider students’ understandings of relevant
terminology are inherently flawed. Instead, students should only be considered to have an informed
naturalistic reasoning (i.e., a normative understanding) about evolutionwhen they are able to explain
the causalmechanismsof evolutionary change.
Althoughmany students held misconception about relevant terminology, a subset of students
continued on to develop scientifically appropriate reasoning strategies in evolution. It is not clear
why some students eventually developed a scientific understanding about evolution while others
did not. One reason may be that even though all students followed the same mandatory National
Curriculum, each student interpreted information through their previous epistemological filter
(Gee, 2008). As such, what is being taught in classrooms (e.g., input) is not the same as what is
learned (e.g., uptake; Gee, 2008). That not all 16-year olds eventually developed a normative
understanding about evolution is in linewith recent research on people’s evolution understanding.
Abraham-Silver and Kisiel (2008) investigated museum visitors’ understanding and acceptance
of evolution in the US, UK, Canada, and Australia. They found that although British museum
visitors were less likely to reject evolution than their US counterparts, the British were as likely as
those from other English speaking countries to hold misconceptions about evolution. Further-
more, in intervention studies where significant changes in students’ understandings about
evolution have been documented there remained a proportion of students whose intuitive ideas
were resistant to change (e.g., Banet&Ayuso, 2003;Geraedts&Boersma, 2006). Thus,we cannot
expect all students to develop a normative understanding about evolution as a result of having
progressed through theNational Curriculumalone.
Figure 3. Evolutionary reasoningwithout relevant language.
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One implication from this research is that in teaching evolution, teachers must not assume
that students will learn the scientific concepts behind the terminology as a result of working
through the National Curriculum; teachers must also address and challenge students’ misconcep-
tions in the teaching and learning process. In addition, students’ use of coexistence models
suggests that teachers must also consider what students already think they know about evolution
when teaching the topic. This will allow the teachers to address alternative conceptions if
necessary.
Endorsement of Multiple Epistemologies
Next, let us examine factors influencing students’ use of multiple epistemologies. As
predicted in hypothesis 3, participants endorsed different epistemologies across the five
interview questions. Specifically, we found that the questions about the finch and seals elicited
more informed naturalistic reasoning than the questions about tigers, humans, and algae, and
that the questions about the tigers and the algae evoked more novice naturalistic reasoning than
the question about finches. This pattern of endorsement is in contrast to findings by Evans et al.
(2010) where adult museum visitors were more likely to endorse informed naturalistic
reasoning formammals and birdswhile endorsing novice naturalistic reasoning formicroscopic
species and invertebrates. Also in contrast with findings by Evans et al. (2010) is that students in
this study were not more likely to endorse creationist reasoning for the chimps/humans
questions than all other entities. Instead, participants were more likely to endorse denial of
evolution reasoning for chimps/humans only in comparison to the question about the seals.
Previous research has indicated that people are less likely to extend evolution to humans than
other entities because of negative ramifications for the purpose of humans’ existence, such as
not having a purpose or free will (Brem, Ranney, & Schindel, 2003). We do not believe this
explanation applies to our sample. Instead, we argue that the lack of support for denial of
evolutionary reasoning is the result of British students being exposed to a set of explanations (at
home and in formal education settings) that less frequently include creationist explanations that
in the southern and midwestern US. Although the UK and the US are similar in terms of
industrialization, the southern and midwestern US, where Evans et al. (2010) collected her data
tends to be more religious than the UK (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2005). Furthermore, as
Kelemen (2003) has previously argued, differences in the majority culture’s willingness to
openly endorse creationist reasoning may result in children growing up in the two countries
being exposed to slightly different types of explanations in parent-child conversations
(Tenenbaum&Hohenstein, 2016). Thus, our study provides further support thatminute cultural
differences may have a significant impact on how people learn to reason about biological
evolution.
One limitation of our study, nonetheless, is that it is cross-sectional. As a result, we cannot
know how students continue to build an understanding about evolution as a result of their
experiences in formal and informal learning settings. Thus, wewere not able to explain why some
students developed a normative understanding about evolutionary theory while others did not.
Future research needs to incorporate longitudinal and even micro-genetic methods to further our
understandings of the underlying processes in the development of students’ reasoning about
evolution. In addition, this study highlights the need for future research to explore more
exhaustively the role of culture in students’ reasoning about biological evolution. We have
demonstrated that secondary students in England tend not to endorse creationist explanations
about evolution, even when they fail to provide a plausible alternative. However, because our
study was not a comparison study, further evidence is needed to determine the role of culture in
people’s reason about biological evolution.
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Conclusion
In summary, this research has found a clear developmental trend in students’ emerging
understandings about evolutionwhere 16-year olds are better able than their younger counterparts
to incorporate scientific concepts in their explanations about evolution, but only within certain
contexts. First, students were able to learn relevant vocabulary without associating this language
with more scientific understandings. Relevant language in turn helped students structure their
reasoning about species change. Whereas age effects on informed naturalistic reasoning were
found using Evans’s et al. (2010) coding scheme across items, using our coding scheme, age
effects on informed naturalistic reasoning were only found for the finch question.We believe that
these effects demonstrate that adolescents have learned the vocabulary but not the concepts
necessary for generalising concepts about evolution across a range of domains. Second, from a
theoretical perspective, this study has contributed to the literature by generating a more valid
coding scheme to be used with secondary school students to better understand their reasoning
about evolution.
Considering current research findings within a teaching and learning context, when teaching
about biological evolution, there is a genuine need for teachers to allow students multiple
opportunities to practice using scientific theories in varying contexts. Doing so will ensure that
students recognize that the underlying mechanism for evolution is the same across different type
of entities and across different contexts. Furthermore, in the assessment of students’ understand-
ing about biological evolution, in addition to being able to use relevant terminology, teachers need
to encourage students to explain what they mean by adapt and evolve, such that misconceptions
can be modified. Given that effective teaching strategies are those that take into consideration
students’ prior knowledge and specific understandings (Bang & Medin, 2010), educators must
tailor classroom instruction to dispelmisconceptions students hold that can inhibit their reasoning
about new concepts. Through suchmethods, students can begin to develop a richer understanding
of evolutionary process that they can apply across different organisms.
Notes
1
Students in this study followed this curriculum. The recent change in curriculum introduced
in 2014 to include evolution in the primary science curriculum did not affect the students in this
study.
2
GCSE stands for the general certificate of secondary education. This is an academic
qualification award in a specified subject taken in a variety of subjects by students aged 14 and 16.
Schools in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland require these awards. GCSE performance is
usually a good indicator of howwell students do in advanced level studies (Gardner, 2014).
3
Third, there was a significant interaction effect of QuestionResponse, F (28,
997)¼ 12.96, p¼ 0.0001, hp2¼ 0.12. We followed up this interaction by conducting separate
ANOVAs for each type of response. For INR, there was a main effect of question, F (3.29,
338.81)¼ 10.42, p¼ 0.0001, hp2¼ 0.09. Students used INR more for the seals (M¼ 0.32,
SE¼ 0.47) and finches (M¼ 0.26, SE¼ 0.44). Students’ endorsement of INR did not differ from
one another than for the questions on chimps/humans (M¼ 0.09, SE¼ 0.28), algae (M¼ 0.09,
SE¼ 0.28), or tiger (M¼ 0.10, SE¼ 0.30). For NNR, there was a main effect of question, F (4,
412)¼ 23.96, p¼ 0.0001, hp2¼ 0.19. Students used NNR most for the algae (M¼ 0.63,
SE¼ 0.49) and humans (M¼ 0.46, SE¼ 0.50). Next, NNR was used most for the tiger
question (M¼ 0.40, SE¼ 0.49), this did not differ significantly from the human question
(M¼ 0.46, SE¼ 0.50). NNR was used the least for finches (M¼ 0.18, SE¼ 0.39) and seals
(M¼ 0.15, SE¼ 0.36) questions. Finally, for INR/NNR, there was a main effect of question,
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F (4, 400)¼ 11.61, p¼ 0.0001, hp2¼ 0.10. Students used INR/NNRmost for the seals (M¼ 0.50,
SE¼ 0.05) and finches (M¼ 0.42, SE¼ 0.05), which did not differ from one another. The use
of NNR/INR did not differ between finches and tigers (M¼ 0.38, SE¼ 0.05). It was used the
least for the human question (M¼ 0.22,SE¼ 0.04) and or algae (M¼ 0.15, SE¼ 0.04) questions.
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